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ESSAY
ISRAEL'S SUPREME COURT APPELLATE
JURISDICTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvit

This Essay reports the results of an empiricalstudy of the Israel Supreme
Court (ISC). It covers the outcomes of 3,562 cases (as of this writing), all
decided in 2006 and 2007, and describes the cases by subject area, litigantpair characteristics,and source ofjurisdiction-mandatoryor discretionary.
In mandatory-jurisdictioncases ending with clear affirmances or reversals,
the ISC affirmed lower court rulings in about 75% of district court criminal
case appeals and about 67% of district court civil case appeals. In discretionary-jurisdictioncases, the ISC rarely granted review. It agreed to review
about 6 % of petitions in criminal cases and about 15 % of petitions in civil
cases. In discretionarycases in which the ISC did grant review, it tended to
reverse at a much higher rate than in mandatory-jurisdictioncases, with an
affirmance rate of 55 % in criminal cases and 31 % in civil cases. Combining denials of review with affirmances resulted in criminal case litigants
obtaining relieffrom the ISC in 2.3 % of appellate filings, and civil case
litigants obtaining relief in 11.0% of appellate filings. The government
faredfar better than other litigants in obtaining reversals of lower court rulings and in securing review of those rulings. Sentencing issues dominated
the criminal docket, and criminalcases predominated over civil cases. Reversal rates were not substantially differentfrom those in cases with analogous
jurisdiction in U.S. state courts of last resort except in discretionary-jurisdiction civil cases. The ISC tended to reverse such cases at a higher rate than
U.S. courts.
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IV.

RESULTS

INTRODUCTION
Studies analyzing appellate cases dominate common law legal
scholarship. Standard articles analyze legal doctrine manifested in appellate-level case opinions, often suggesting improved analysis. Quantitative study of appellate outcomes is less common but not
infrequent. Two lines of quantitative analysis have grown in recent
years. First, recent legal and political science literature highlights the
importance of distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction in analyzing appellate court behavior. In addition to jurisdiction's theoretical importance in designing the appeals process,'
basic case characteristics such as reversal rates and dissent rates are
associated with jurisdictional source. 2 Models of judicial behavior, including models of United States Supreme Court justices' behavior,
may be questionable if they fail to account for discretionary case selection.3 Second, recent studies of U.S. federal and state intermediate
I See, e.g., Steven Shavell, On the Design of the Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 63 (2010).
2 Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State
Supreme Courts: The Centrality ofjurisdictionalSource, 89 B.U. L. REv. 1451, 1454-55 (2009).
3 See Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Ducking Trouble: CongressionallyInduced Selection
Bias in the Supreme Court's Agenda, 71 J. POL. 574, 574-76 (2009) (demonstrating that congressional preferences influence the Supreme Court's decisions on grants of certiorari);
Jonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R Lax, Case Selection and the Study ofjudicial Politics, 3 J.
EmPIRICAL LEGAL S-rUD. 407, 408 (2008) ("[T]he Court's selection process raises the potential for selection bias in the inferences we draw from its cases."). Failure to account for the
mechanism by which courts filter the opinions that are publicly available can also lead to
questionable results. See Denise M. Keele, Robert W. Malmsheimer, Donald W. Floyd &
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appellate courts show a strong tendency of appellate courts to affirm
lower-court decisions, but with defendants faring better on civil appeals than plaintiffs. 4 Such asymmetric outcomes are of obvious interest and resonate with a line of analysis dating back at least to Marc
Galanter's classic article, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead.5
This Essay contributes to both lines of analysis through a study of
Israeli Supreme Court (ISC) decisions.6 The ISC is of interest because
it sits atop a high-quality common law legal system and has, in addition to other duties, substantial appellate discretionary and mandatory
jurisdiction. In some cases, it has mandatory jurisdiction as the sole
appellate court available to litigants. 7 In other cases, the ISC provides
a second level of appellate review in which its jurisdiction is
discretionary.8
A synergistic benefit of the above analyses is that they require a
rare statistical description of a broad class of ISC case outcomes-all
Lianjun Zhang, An Analysis of IdeologicalEffects in Published Versus UnpublishedJudicial Opinions, 6J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 213, 234-36 (2009).

4 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal fromJury orJudge Trial: Defendants'Advantage,3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 125, 125 (2001) [hereinafter AppealfromJury orJudge
Trial]; Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobiain the Appellate Courts: Civil
Rights Really Do Differfrom Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 947 [hereinafter
Plaintiphobia];Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases:
Further Exploration of Anti-PlaintiffAppellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 659
(2004); Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical
Study of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 137 (2009).
5 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'v REv. 95, 125 (1974) (explaining the litigation advantages enjoyed by
wealthy, professional, and culturally dominant "repeat players").
6 Previous empirical studies conducted with respect to the ISC include the following:
GAD BARzIAi, EPHRAIM YUCHTMAN-YAAR & ZEEV SEGAL, THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND
THE ISRAELI PUBLIC (1994)

(Hebrew); Yoav Dotan, Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?

Resource Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court ofJustice, 33 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 1059 (1999); Yoav Dotan & Menachem Hofnung, Interest Groups in the Israeli
High Court offustice: MeasuringSuccess in Litigation and in Out-of-Court Settlements, 23 LAW &
Pot'Y 1 (2001); Meron Gross & Yoram Shachar, How Are Supreme Court Panels Selected - A
Quantitative Analysis, 29 HEBREW U. L. REv. 567 (1999) (Hebrew); Menachem Hofnung &
Keren Weinshall Margel, judicial Setbacks, Material Gains: TerrorLitigation at the Israeli High
Court of Justice, 7 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 664 (2010); Eli Salzberger, ActingJustices in the
Supreme Court and judicial Independence - TheoreticalAnalysis and EmpiricalFindings, 19 BAR
ILAN L. REv. 541 (2003) (Hebrew); Yoram Shachar, Meron Gross & Ron Haris, Anatomy of
Discourse and Disagreements in the IsraeliSupreme Court - A QuantitativeAnalysis, 20 TEL Aviv
U. L. REv. 749 (1997) (Hebrew); Yoram Shachar, Ron Haris & Meron Gross, Reference Patterns of the Supreme Court - A QuantitativeAnalysis, 27 HEBREW U. L. REv. 119 (1996); Yoram
Shacher, Meron Gross & Chanan Goldshmidt, 100 LeadingPrecedents - A QuantitativeAnalysis, 7 HAIFA U. L. REv. 243 (2003) (Hebrew); Keren Weinshall-Margel, Supreme Court
Decision-Making: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective from Israel (June 29, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) [hereinafter ComparativePerspective], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632646.
7
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, § 41(a)
(1983-1984).
8 See id. § 41(b).
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of the appealed civil and criminal cases for which the Israeli Judicial
Authority (IJA) database supplies information. Although such
description of case outcomes may seem mundane, case results should
be of substantial practical interest. For example, it is surely of interest
to U.S. attorneys bringing product liability cases in federal court to
know that plaintiff appeals of losses at trial pursued to conclusion resulted in reversal in 12% of such appeals, but that analogous defendant appeals resulted in reversal in 38% of such appeals.9 Israeli
attorneys likely are no less interested in systematic information about
how the masses of cases fare on appeal. Moreover, in recent times the
ISC has been the object of public debate in Israel,10 and therefore
findings regarding its performance are of interest to both decision
makers and the public at large.
Our results provide new insights, but also confirm some results
reported by the 1996 Shachar-Gross study" for the ISC as well as for
other appellate courts. In cases in which the ISC has mandatory jurisdiction, we find the expected "affirmed effect"-affirmance rates in
both civil and criminal cases were about 70%, similar to rates found in
other courts with mandatory jurisdiction. In cases over which the ISC
has discretionary jurisdiction, we find lower affirmance rates-about
55% in reviewed criminal cases and about 31% in reviewed civil cases.
In exercising its discretionary jurisdiction, the ISC rarely granted review. It agreed to review on the merits about 6% of criminal cases and
about 15% of civil cases. Unlike studies of U.S. federal and state
courts, 1 2 we find no strong evidence of asymmetric civil-case reversal
rates based on plaintiff versus defendant status. We do, however, find
the government to be a highly successful litigant, both in obtaining
9

Plaintiphobia,supra note 4, at 954 tbl.2.
Until the early 1990s, the ISC enjoyed a high level of legitimacy among the Israeli
public and was one of the most popular state institutions. In a 1994 study, over two-thirds
of respondents viewed the ISC as representative of the common citizen. See BARZILAI ET
AL., supra note 6, at 211. Over the course of the last decade, we have been witness to a
decrease in public trust of the ISC. In a 2008 study conducted by Arye Rattner and Meir
Ya'ish, only 48% of Jewish respondents and 53% of Arab respondents expressed trust in
the ISC, while a parallel study, conducted by Rattner in 2000, showed that 80% of Jewish
respondents and 66% of Arab respondents expressed trust in the ISC. See Poll- Decline in
Public Confidence in Government Institutions, HAARETZ.COM http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/
spages/972853.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (Hebrew).
Due to the decrease in public legitimacy, the role and status of the ISC became much
more controversial and moved, in recent years, to the center stage of the political debate.
Questions regarding the nomination of justices, the ISC jurisdiction, its power ofjudicial
review, and, more generally, judicial activism, are currently hotly debated among Israeli
politicians, raising great public and media interest. For an elaborate discussion, see
MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAw & CULTURE IN ISRAEL IN THE BEGINNING OF THE 21ST CENTURY
(2008) (Hebrew).
11
Yoram Shachar & Miron Gross, Acceptance and Rejection of Appeals to the Supreme
Court: Quantitative Analyses, 13 LEGAL STUD. 329, 335-38 (1996) (Hebrew).
12 See sources cited supra note 4.
10
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review and in obtaining reversal of judgments it appealed. In both
mandatory-jurisdiction cases and discretionary-jurisdiction criminal
cases, ISC reversal rates were similar to those of U.S. state supreme
courts. In discretionary-jurisdiction civil cases, the ISC reversed at a
significantly higher rate than U.S. state courts and at a significantly
higher rate than the ISC reversed discretionary criminal cases.
Part I of this Essay reviews the relevant literature on litigation outcomes. Part II provides relevant background information about the
Israeli court system. Part III discusses our hypotheses, Part IV reports
the results, which are discussed in Part V, and the final Part concludes.
I
PRIOR LITERATURE

Prior studies show substantial differences in appellate case outcomes depending on whether jurisdiction is mandatory or discretionary, as well as on which party appealed.
A.

Reversal Rates Vary by Jurisdictional Source

In a study of approximately 7,000 U.S. state supreme court opinions issued in 2003, Eisenberg and Miller report an aggregate reversal
rate of 28.1% in mandatory-jurisdiction cases.13 Reversal rates in federal appellate court cases with published opinions reportedly are
about one-third.14 A study covering one hundred years (1870-1970)
with a sample of approximately 6,000 opinions from sixteen U.S. state
supreme courts reported a mandatory-jurisdiction case reversal rate of
36.8% in published opinions.15 Studies that are not limited to available opinions report lower reversal rates, presumably because courts
select the cases in which to issue opinions. In studies of U.S. federal
courts of appeals, the reversal rate for tried cases is about 20%.16 For
U.S. state intermediate appellate courts-courts with largely
mandatory jurisdiction-reversal rates in tried cases are about 32%.17
In discretionaryjurisdiction cases, Eisenberg and Miller report an
aggregate reversal rate of 51.6%,18 and the hundred-year study
13 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1454.
14 Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart J. Schwab, Wat Shapes Perceptionsof the Federal Court
System?, 56 U. CI. L. REV. 501, 517-18 (1989).
15 Note, CourtingReversal: The Supervisory Role of State Supreme Courts, 87YALE L.J. 1191,
1201 (1978).
16 See Appeal fromJury orJudge Trial supra note 4, at 131 (showing overall reversal rate
of 20.7% of federal tort and contract trials from fiscal years 1988 through 1997); Plaintiphobia, supra note 4, at 952 tbl.1 (showing overall reversal rate of 18.4% of federal civil
trials from fiscal years 1988 through 1997).
17 Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 4, at 134 tbl. 2 (showing overall trial reversal rate of
32.1% of state tort, contract, and property trials disposed of in 2001).
18 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1454.
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showed a discretionary case reversal rate of 50.0%.19 The U.S. Supreme Court, with a nearly entirely discretionary docket, reverses or
vacates over 77% of the cases it accepts for discretionary review. 2 0
Due to procedural and structural differences, comparison of reversal rates across countries can only be suggestive. Nevertheless,
courts of last resort with discretionary jurisdiction in other countries
also reverse a substantial fraction of cases they review on the merits.
The Taiwan Supreme Court (TSC) exercises discretionary jurisdiction
(de facto or de jure) over cases first reviewed by an intermediate appellate court. In a study of 1,836 civil cases adjudicated by the TSC
from 1996 through 2008, the appellant prevailed in 652 of 1,836 cases,
a reversal rate of 35.5%.21 This rate includes procedural dismissals. If
one excludes procedural dismissals, the reversal rate was 68.4% (652
of 953 cases on the merits).22 France's Court of Cassation effectively
screens cases for nonadmissibility ("inadmissible or not founded on
serious grounds") and excludes full review of about 30% of civil cases
on this ground.2 3 Of the civil cases granted full review and not withdrawn or forfeited, about 47% result in quashing the lower court's
decision.2 4
B.

Reversal Rates Vary by the Party Appealing

The overall reversal rates described above mask asymmetry depending on whether the plaintiff or the defendant was the appealing
party. In U.S. intermediate appellate courts with largely mandatory
jurisdiction, asymmetries generally exist in the rate at which plaintiffs
and defendants achieve reversals of trial court rulings. In appeals
from federal court trials, reversal rates in appeals by defendants are
higher than reversal rates in appeals by plaintiffs. In a ten-year period, the reversal rate for appeals by defendants was 32.5%, compared
Note, supra note 15, at 1201.
20 See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-The Statistics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 497, 505
tbl.HI(D) (2004) (showing that out of the seventy-six cases the Court reviewed on writ of
certiorari and disposed of by full opinion, it reversed 64.5% and vacated 13.2%). The
Court vacated 95.2% of the forty-two cases it disposed of by memorandum orders. Id. This
figure excludes a handful of specialized dispositions. Id. at 505 n.o.
21 Theodore Eisenberg & Kuo-Chang Huang, The Effect of Rules Shifting Supreme Court
Jurisdictionfrom Mandatoy to Discretionary-AnEmpiricalLesson from Taiwan, INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 12 tbl.2).
22 Id. Interestingly, the reversal rate was not significantly influenced by legislation
seeking to give the TSC greater control over its docket apparently because the TSC had
already seized de facto control over its docket before the legislative reform. See id. at
30-31.
23 About the Court, COUR DE CASSATION, www.courdecassation.fr/about the court_
9256.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2011).
24
SECRtTARIAT CNERAL, ANNUAIRE STATISTIQUE DE IA JUSTICE 27 (2008) (Fr.) (2006
data) (reporting annually on statistics of the French legal system).
19
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to 12.0% for appeals by plaintiffs. 25 The defendant advantage pervades case categories, with defendants faring better than plaintiffs in
almost every class of case. 26 A similar asymmetry was found in U.S.
state courts, with defendants obtaining reversals in 41.5% of their appeals compared to plaintiffs obtaining reversals in 21.5% of their appeals.2 7 The prodefendant pattern persisted in every studied case
category but one. 28
As a litigant, the government has characteristics in addition to its
plaintiff-defendant status. Prior research suggests that the government may be an especially formidable litigant. Not only can it construct legal rules favorable to it through legislation, but once in court,
the government is difficult to defeat. For example, the government
appears to fare better as an antitrust litigant.29 The pattern of tort
and employment discrimination litigation outcomes is somewhat
more favorable to government defendants than to private defendants, 30 though the evidence is mixed.31 The clearest evidence that the
government is different is in the higher trial rate in litigation against
the government.3 2 At the appellate level, the study of 100 years of
state supreme court opinions found that city and state governments
were relatively successful as appellate litigants. 3 3 But a study of appellate outcomes of trial appeals covering every trial in forty-six counties
found no statistically significant government effect.34
In Israel, a prior study showed a progovernment tendency. In a
study of 7,147 Israeli Supreme Court cases representing 40% of all
cases published in the years 1948-1994, Shachar and Gross report a
variance in reversal rates of trial rulings between state and nonstate
actors. In criminal appeals, the State secured reversal in 70.1% of the
cases it appealed. Criminal defendants, in contrast, secured reversal
Plaintiphobia,supra note 4, at 952 tbl.1.
See id. at 952-54 (showing prodefendant differential for nearly every case category);
see also Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 672 tbl.4 (showing prodefendant differential for each
major case category).
27
Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 4, at 134 tbl.2.
28
Id. (product liability).
29
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13J. LEGAL
STuD. 1, 52-53 (1984) (comparing prior studies and noting higher government success
rate).
30
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining Constitutional Tort Litigation:
The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REv.
719, 775-76 (1988).
31
Theodore Eisenberg & Henry Farber, The Government as Litigant: Further Tests of the
Case Selection Model, 5 AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 94, 119-27 (2003).
32
See id.
33
See Stanton Wheeler, Bliss Cartwright, Robert A. Kagan & Lawrence M. Friedman,
Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21
ILAw & Soc'v REv. 403, 418 (1987).
34
Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 4, at 141-44 (finding no significant government
variable in regression models of reversal of trial outcomes on appeal).
25
26
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in only 34.9% of the cases reported. In civil appeals, reversal rates in
appeals initiated by nonstate actors-whether plaintiffs or defendants
at the trial court level-against the State were 31.2%. Reversal rates in
appeals by the State were 53%.35
II
THE ISRAELI JUDICIARY

Israel is a unitary state with a single system of regular law courts of
general jurisdiction with appellate review of decisions, as well as other
tribunals or authorities with judicial power. The institutions other
than regular law courts have jurisdiction limited by subject matter or
persons covered. Of the regular law courts, the judiciary law establishes three levels of courts: the Supreme Court, district courts, and
magistrates' courts.3 6 District courts and magistrates' court are trial
courts; the Supreme Court functions as both an appellate court and
High Court ofJustice.37 The Judiciary portion of the Basic Law strives
to assure judicial independence through methods of selecting judges,
terms of office, and independence of other branches of government.
There are no juries.
The twenty-nine magistrates' courts are the basic trial courts.
Magistrate courts serve the locality and district in which they sit. They
generally have criminal jurisdiction over offenses with a potential punishment of a fine or up to seven years imprisonment. They have civil
jurisdiction in matters involving up to a specified monetary amountcurrently 2.5 million shekels (approximately U.S. $690,000)-as well
as over the use and possession of real property. Magistrates' courts
also serve as traffic courts, municipal courts, family courts, and small
claims courts. Generally, a single judge presides in each case unless
the President of the magistrates' court directs that a panel of three
judges hear the case instead.3 8
District courts have jurisdiction in any matter that is not within
the sole jurisdiction of another court. The six district courts sit in
Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheva, Nazareth, and Petah-Tikva.
35
See Shachar & Gross, supra note 11. The findings reported below can be understood as compatible with the findings of the Shachar-Gross study. However, one must
proceed with caution in comparing the two studies, which were conducted using different
methodologies and on very different databases. Our study included all Israeli Supreme
Court cases both published and unpublished, whereas the Shachar-Gross study referred to
40% of published cases.
36
See generally Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271
(1983-1984) (setting forth provisions governing the composition and operation of the Israeli judiciary).
37 This study does not include cases in which the ISC functions in its capacity as the
High Court of Justice.
38
Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 3.
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The Petah-Tikva court was added in 2007.39 As courts of first instance,
district courts hear criminal cases in which the accused faces punishment of more than seven years imprisonment. District courts' civil
jurisdiction extends to matters in which more than 2.5 million shekels
are in dispute. District courts also hear cases dealing with, inter alia,
companies and partnership, arbitration, prisoners' petitions, and appeals on tax matters, and serve as administrative courts. These courts
also hear appeals ofjudgments of the magistrates' courts. Generally, a
panel is composed of a single district court judge. A panel of three
judges hears appeals of magistrates' courts' case judgments and hears
cases in the first instance when the accused is charged with an offense
punishable by imprisonment of ten or more years. A three-judge
panel also sits when the President or Deputy President of the District
Court so directs.40
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear criminal and civil
appeals from judgments of the district courts. Cases that begin in a
district court are appealable, as of right, to the Supreme Court. Other
matters, particularly the mass of cases that begin in the magistrates'
courts, may be appealed only with the Supreme Court's permission. 4 1
The Supreme Court's decisions are binding on lower courts, and
Israel adheres to the principle of stare decisis.4 2
The Supreme Court generally sits in panels comprised of three
justices. The President or the Deputy President of the Court may expand the size of the panel to any uneven number of justices. Each
panel also has the power to decide to expand its size. The Court can
also decide to initiate a "further hearing" in which a panel of five or
more justices will rehear a case decided by a smaller panel of the Supreme Court. A single justice may hear petitions for injunctions, temporary restraining orders, and other interim rulings, as well as for
orders nisi, but a single justice may not refuse to grant an order nisi or
make it contingent on only some of its assertions. A single justice may
hear appeals against interim rulings of district courts or against the
verdict of a single district courtjudge hearing an appeal from a case in
a magistrate's court.4 3
Courts sitting on appeal, whether district courts or the ISC, are
formally authorized to adjudicate both fact and law but seldom intervene in factual matters and tend to limit their judgment to questions
of law. The underlying rationale is that appellate judges usually are
39

Ordinances of Courts (Establishment of the Central District Court), 2007, KT 6585,

824.
40

41
42
43

Courts Law (Consolidated Version) ch. 2, art. 2.
Id. § 40; Basic Law: Judicature, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101, ch. 2 (1983-1984).
See Basic Law: Judicature § 20.
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) §§ 26, 30.
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not directly exposed to witnesses and other types of evidence. This
does not negate the ability of the appellate court to examine whether
the factual basis upon which the decision of the lower court is premised is anchored on sound evidentiary foundations, but the de facto
appeal practice is not one of a de novo review. Our study refers both
to civil and criminal appeals, which are regulated in a slightly differential manner under Israeli law. Therefore, we will address each of the
categories separately.4 4
A.

Civil Cases

In civil cases, any party harmed by the final decision of the court
of first instance can appeal as of right to a court of higher instance.
Thus, cases initiated in the magistrates' courts entail a right of appeal
to the district courts, while cases commencing at the district courts are
appealed as of right to the ISC.
In addition to the appeal as of right, litigants can petition the
court for discretionary appeal in two types of situations: First, when
they wish to challenge an interim decision on a pending case in the
court of first instance. This category of cases was excluded from the
study. Second, when they wish to challenge the final decision of a
district court sitting as an appellate court. 45 Thus, when a case is initiated in a magistrate's court and appealed as of right to a district court,
litigants can petition the ISC for a second level of appellate review. 46
The requirements of discretionary appeal were laid down in the
landmark case of Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or,47 the most cited precedent in Israeli case law. 48 According to the ISC's ruling in Chenion
Haifa, it should grant discretionary appeal only when there are significant legal or public issues at stake that transcend the interests of the
litigating parties. Such legal or public issues may include, for example, conflicting rulings by lower courts that were not settled by the ISC
and matters of constitutional significance. The ISC stresses that the
See, e.g., CrimA 125/50 David Ya'akobovich v. State of Israel 5(1) PD 519 [1950].
This was the legal situation at the time period relevant for this study. See Courts
Law (Consolidated Version) §§ 41, 52 (effective prior to the amendment described below).
As of 2009, litigants in civil cases can no longer petition the court for discretionary appeal
in all interim decisions. In 2008, the Courts Law was amended to include a restriction
according to which the Minister of Justice is authorized to issue a decree stating types of
decisions that are immune from interlocutory appeal. The Minister issued such a decree
on March 7, 2009, stating such types of decisions including postponement of court hearings, size of judicial documents, and the like. See Courts Decree (Types of Decisions on
Which No Interlocutory Appeal Would Be Granted), 2009.
46
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) § 41(b).
47 CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 [1982].
48 According to Dinim Veod, an Israeli online legal database, the case has been cited
in 1,187 cases-more than any other Israeli court ruling. See Search Results, DIM VEOD,
http://www.dinimveod.co.il (last updated Feb. 27, 2011) (search "case No. 103/82")
(Hebrew).
44
45
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outcome reached by the lower court-whether correct or erroneous,
desirable or undesirable-is immaterial to the decision on the matter
of granting a discretionary appeal. 4 9 In other words, at least in theory,
the ISC should not take into consideration the merit of the lowercourt ruling when deciding whether to grant a discretionary appeal.
When a request for discretionary appeal is filed, the ISC should
proceed in two phases: first, examine whether the Chenion Haifa requirements5 0 are satisfied. The general practice is for a single justice
to decide this phase. The justice can decide to deny review and thus
dismiss the case, or to grant review, leading to the second phase-a
panel of three justices who then hear the appeal and decide on the
merits. In practice, the boundaries between the two phases are
blurred: The single justice often decides to deny review, grounding its
decision not only on the Chenion Haifa requirements but also on the
merits of the case. Similarly, the three-justice panel sitting on appeal
sometimes rejects the case based on the procedural requirements laid
out in Chenion Haifa.
B.

Criminal Cases

In criminal cases, a verdict issued by the district court sitting in
the first instance can be appealed as of right to the ISC.5 1 A verdict
issued by the magistrates' court in the first instance can be appealed
as of right to the district court. In Israel, both prosecution and defense have symmetric rights of appeal, as the prosecution is authorized to appeal a defendant's acquittal.5 2 Courts of appeals preside in
panels of three judges.
When a case is initiated in the magistrates' court and appealed as
of right to the district court, both the prosecution and the defense can
petition the Israeli Supreme Court for a second appellate review. It
should be noted that unlike in civil trials, interim trial court decisions

49

See CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123, 127-28 [1982].
See id.
See Courts Law (Consolidated Version) § 41(a).
Israeli law, which does not differentiate between appeals of acquittals and convictions, grants the prosecution the authority to appeal a defendant's acquittal. This authority is a matter of public debate in Israel. Just recently, a committee that was established to
reexamine the authorization has delivered its report, approving the current situation. See
50
51
52

THE REPORT OF THE COMM. To RE-EXAMINE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS BASED ON MAJORITYOPINIONs & APPEALS OVER AcQuIrrALs IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, http://wwwjustice.gov.il/

MOJHeb/YeutzVehakika/News/Dochankar.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) (Hebrew).
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in criminal trials cannot be appealed,'5 3 with only limited exceptions
such as judicial disqualification.5 4
The requirements of discretionary appeal laid down in Chenion
Haifa apply to the criminal realm as well. 5 5 Namely, the result
reached by the lower court should not play a role in the decision
whether to grant or deny a discretionary appeal. Therefore, according to the law on the books, an argument made by the defendant concerning the stigmatizing effect of conviction 5 6 or even the severity of
punishment does not substantiate a right to second appellate review.57
A request for discretionary appeal can be decided before a single
justice or a panel of three justices.5 8 The court is authorized to treat
the request for appeal as an appeal and decide it on the merits. 59
III
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY

In this Part, we first suggest what the observed affirmance rate on
appeal may be expected to look like in courts with mandatory appellate jurisdiction and then explore how discretionary jurisdiction might
alter that expectation. We also formulate hypotheses about the relation between reversal rates and litigant status.
A.

The Affirmed Effect

In the context of mandatory appeals, selection theory, which
highlights the importance of nonrandom case selection at stages of
legal proceedings, forecasts that appellate outcomes should act like
trial outcomes.60 Under simplifying assumptions, the theory forecasts
a 50% reversal rate on appeal61 because any tendency of appellate
courts to affirm or reverse will be incorporated into the parties' decision whether to appeal or settle following the outcome at trial. The
residue of cases remaining after the clearing effects of posttrial settle53
Parties to the criminal trial sometimes try to bypass the prohibition on interlocutory appeals by filing petitions to the High Court ofJustice, which is authorized to review
petitions against state agents (including the judicial branch). The High Court ofJustice is
very reluctant to grant such petitions and does so only in very rare cases.
54 Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, §§ 146-147
(1981-1982).
55 See DC 4927/92 State of Israel v. Ben Yehuda (1992) (unpublished opinion).
56 CrimA 1245/93 Shtarkman v. State of Israel 47(2) PD 177 [1993].
57 DC 3251/91 Yishai v. State of Israel, PD 45(5) 441 (1991).
58 Criminal Procedure Rules, 5734-1974, § 44(7).
59 Criminal Procedure Law (Consolidated Version), 5742-1982, 36 LSI 35, § 205
(1981-1982).
60 Appeal from jury or Judge Trial, supra note 4, at 131-34.
61
Priest & Klein, supra note 29, at 29 (stating that selection model "applies indistinguishably to trial and appellate disputes").
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ment and decisions to appeal would be expected to leave a close set of
cases with an observed affirmance rate of about 50%.62
But no study of the mass of appeals reveals a 50% affirmance
6
rate. 3 The tendency is to affirm at a higher rate, notwithstanding the
case-selection process. The affirmed effect is consistent with appellate-court deference to trial-court decisions (deference often mandated by the standard of appellate review) and with observed rates of
expert agreement (trial judges and appellate judges being presumed
legal experts). 64 If every case were appealed, one might expect an
affirmance rate of about 80% because of these factors-not far from
the observed affirmance rate. 65 Case-selection processes are undoubtedly at work, but not to the extent of producing affirmance rates close
to 50%. If the case-selection process is not clearing the easy cases so as
to leave only close cases on appeal, it may be because appeal is not
very costly. 66 Whatever the cause, based on deference, expert agreement rates,'6 7 and past research on appeals, we expect to observe affirmance rates that substantially exceed 50%, at least in mandatory
cases.
B.

The Distinction Between Issue-Based and Case-Based
Adjudication

Discretionary review tends to shift courts' focus away from casebased adjudication, which emphasizes providing justice in individual
cases, and toward issue-based adjudication.6 8 Case-outcome patterns
and judicial preferences should manifest themselves differently in the
62 Appeal from Jury or judge Trial, supra note 4, at 132-33. A subvariety of selection
theory stresses information asymmetries between appellants and appellees and can forecast
affirmance rates substantially different from 50%. The available data seem inconsistent
with this theory. Id. at 132 n.12.
63
See sources cited supra note 4.
64 Appeal from jury or judge Trial, supra note 4, at 133.
65 Id.
66
Id. (citing RicHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 195
(1996)). Priest and Klein observe that a party's (presumably a defendant in most civil
cases) greater interest in precedent might create differential stakes. Priest & Klein, supra
note 29, at 54. This suggests that defendants would appeal less often for fear of establishing adverse appellate precedents. But prior work does not find a pronounced difference
in the appeal rates of plaintiffs and defendants; thus this source of possible differential
stakes or case selection is likely not substantial. See Appealfrom jury orJudge Trial,supra note
4, at 132 n.11.
67
Cf Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, TDial by Jury or Judge: Transcending
Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1153-54 (1992) (discussing the surprising rate of
agreement between judges and juries).
68 See Lewis A. Komhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts. II. Legal Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 441, 445-46 (1992); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and
the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1993) (explaining that casebased outcomes and issue-based outcomes may differ). As Eisenberg and Miller note, "The
relationship is not perfect, of course. Judges with discretionary jurisdiction may select
some cases on the basis of the facts, especially if they consider the matter impor-
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two classes of adjudication with a less clear forecast of an affirmed
effect in discretionaryjurisdiction cases. Courts probably are more inclined to grant review of cases where the issue is important simply
because resolution of the issue affects many other cases, whereas casebased adjudication primarily affects only the litigants before the court.
Importance or other discretionary case-selection criteria often
are associated with factors likely to be related to case outcomes. Cases
generating conflicting lower-court rulings are important because
nonuniformity may attract higher court review. The existence of
lower-court conflict suggests that such cases may be more difficult to
resolve than the mass of cases. Such discretionarily reviewed cases are
therefore more likely to be reversed.6 9 And human nature suggests
that appellate judges are more likely to reach out to review lowercourt cases with which they disagree.7 0
Other factors being equal, we would expect ISC reversal rates to
be higher in discretionary-review cases than in mandatory-jurisdiction
cases. But a key feature that distinguishes the ISC from U.S. state supreme courts and the TSC in Taiwan is that ISC mandatory jurisdiction is associated with the absence of prior appellate review.7 1 In the
United States and Taiwan, mandatory high-court jurisdiction can exist
even when a case has had prior appellate review.72 In Israel, cases that
the ISC must review have not yet been reviewed by a lower appellate
court. So in these cases, the ISC serves as both the first and last appellate court. In this sense, the ISC is similar to U.S. state supreme courts
in states that do not have intermediate appellate courts (IAC).
One also expects the presence or absence of an IAC to influence
the reversal rate. When IAC jurisdiction exists, a case appealed to a
court of last resort has already been reviewed by an appellate court
that, presumably, usually provided a correct ruling. This could depress the incentive to appeal to yet another court, at a nontrivial cost
in time and money, because a strong signal about the propriety of the
ruling of the court of first instance has already been delivered.7 3
Thus, the flow of cases appealed to a court of last resort likely differs
depending on whether IAC jurisdiction exists.
In addition, since a lower court has reviewed all discretionary-jurisdiction cases, the ISC's relative rate of reversal may also differ from
U.S. appellate courts. The association of the jurisdictional basis for a
case with the presence or absence of IAC review makes it difficult to
tant ....
Conversely, judges in mandatory cases will sometimes be primarily concerned
with an issue rather than a case's outcome." Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1460.
69 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1461.
70

Id.

71
72

See ComparativePerspective, supra note 6, at 16.
See Eisenberg & Huang, supra note 21, at 3.
See Note, supra note 15, at 1201-02.
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confidently hypothesize about the relative rate of reversal in
mandatory- and discretionaryjurisdiction cases. Regardless of the possible effects of IAC review, ISC judges, like other judges, likely tend to
select for review cases with which they disagree, despite contrary rules
emanating from the Chenion Haifa decision discussed above. We
therefore expect reversal rates to be lower in mandatoryjurisdiction
cases than in discretionary cases.
We expect the direction of the mandatory-discretionary reversal
rate difference to be the same for civil and criminal cases. Judges selecting criminal as well as civil cases likely tend to select for review
cases with which they disagree. And the focus on difficult or important issues in discretionary cases should tend to promote reversal in
criminal as well as in civil cases.
C.

Litigant Status

The U.S. results described above show a consistent pattern in
both federal and state court of civil defendants faring better than civil
plaintiffs on appeal. Reasons for this difference have been explored
elsewhere and no smoking-gun explanation exists. By process of elimination, it has been hypothesized that appellate judges have a different worldview than trial court judges, which leads appellate courts to
reverse plaintiff trial court victories at a higher rate than defendant
trial court victories. 74 Appellate judges-removed from the day-to-day
action in the trial court and working solely from a paper record-may
perceive trial courts as more favorable to civil plaintiffs than trial
courts in fact are. If the fact of sitting on an appellate court does
generate a different worldview, then we expect the U.S results to be
replicated in the ISC. In mandatory cases at least, the class of cases
most studied in the United States, we might expect civil defendants to
fare better on appeal than civil plaintiffs.
Reversal rates in criminal cases should be shaped by which party
is appealing. In Israel, unlike the United States, prosecutors may appeal trial court outcomes favorable to criminal defendants, challenging both acquittal and leniency of sentencing. On average, the
government resources available to prosecutors likely substantially exceed those available to the mass of criminal defendants, leading to a
predicted government edge in probability of prevailing on appeal. In
addition, the strong interest in liberty that one expects to generate
appeals by criminal defendants should lead to an objectively weak
group of appeals by criminal defendants, reinforcing the expected
pattern of more progovernment appellate rulings.
74

See Plaintiphobia,supra note 4.
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In civil cases, as noted above, some evidence exists of governmental entities faring better than private entities. We expect the forces
that lead to government litigation success to apply with at least as
much force in Israel. The resources available to the government, the
government's less direct need than private parties to be driven by the
financial bottom line, the government's repeat-player experience, and
the courts' existence as part of the government, however formally independent, all suggest that the government should be a relatively successful litigant. It is theoretically possible for some governmental
features to be associated with lower levels of success. Perhaps the less
direct financial constraints push government officials to litigate weak
cases that a private party would forego. Although this likely occurs
with some frequency, on balance the forces suggesting governmental
litigation success likely outweigh the forces suggesting lower government litigation success.
D. The Data and Methodology
The time periods this study covers vary based on the criminal or
civil nature of cases. Both classes of cases include at least seventeen
months of data. The cases included in this study are: (1) for discretionary- and mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases, all cases decided in
the years 2006 and 2007; and (2) for discretionary and mandatory civil
cases, all cases decided in 2007 and all cases decided in the months of
August through December 2006. The study includes every ISC substantive opinion available online via the official IJA website for all
cases decided in these time periods. Cases identified by the search
that were not actual decisions granting review, denying review, or on
the merits were eliminated from the sample. Under Israeli law prevailing in the years covered by the study, parties were permitted to file
interlocutory appeals in civil proceedings on every decision made by
the court in the course of the trial. Since these decisions do not represent the final ruling of the lower court, we separately analyzed the
data by accounting for discretionary civil interlocutory appeals that
appeared in our sample. The results, not reported here, do not materially differ from the results we report here using our full sample.7 5 In
75 To account for interlocutory appeals, we first surveyed 298 discretionary civil appeals (approximately half of all such appeals in our sample), finding 79 interlocutory appeals. We then assessed whether the interlocutory appeals systematically differed from
other appeals. Interlocutory appeals did not materially differ in the distribution of case
types and types of litigants reported in Table 1, in the pattern of outcomes reported in
Table 2, or in the impact of having a government litigant reported in Table 6. Interlocutory appeals did, however, incur a higher rate of reversal in cases granted review than that
reported in Table 3. Accordingly, we estimate that excluding all interlocutory appeals
would reduce the discretionary civil case reversal rate in Table 3 to approximately 52%
from 68.5%, which is still statistically significantly higher than the reversal rate in
mandatory civil cases. Similarly, the rate of granting review for interlocutory appeals was

2011] ISRAEL'S SUPREME COURT APPELLATEJURISDICTION

709

criminal proceedings, this issue does not arise as interlocutory appeals
are prohibited.7 6
Since the IJA website contains all of the cases decided by the
7
ISC, 7 the resulting database of 3,562 decisions provides a complete
picture of ISC doctrinal decisional activity in the periods covered. We
tested the comprehensiveness and accuracy of the database by comparing it with data obtained from the ISC's secretariat. This comparison suggested that the data obtained from the IJA website is indeed
comprehensive, covering the full gamut of criminal and civil cases.
The data thus provide a sound basis for assessing the relation, in
these cases, between jurisdiction and reversal rates, dissent rates, workload, and other attributes of ISC behavior. Even allowing for substantial limitations noted below, the cases we study are important.
Israel adheres to the principle of stare decisis and thus the ISC's decisions are binding on lower courts. Therefore, cases that are appealed
in the ISC announce and influence legal doctrine. They are the cases
that provide reasoning and guidance to lower courts and litigants. If
the pattern of outcomes varies by jurisdictional source in these cases,
those findings are important in explaining the development of legal
doctrine.
The database is subject to limitations. First, the study covers ISC
appellate activity only in regular civil and criminal matters, thus omitting appeals regarding specialized courts including family courts,
rabbinical courts, labor courts, and military courts. Second, the study
omits ISC activity not involving the substance of the case, including
actions on procedural matters as well as auxiliary issues such as judicial disqualification, contempt of court, damages for unjustified indictment, and court and attorney fees. Third, since the opinions
cover only limited time periods, trends over time cannot be assessed.
higher than for other appeals. We estimate that, if interlocutory appeals were excluded,
the rate of granting review would fall to approximately 13% from the 15.3% reported in
Table 6.
In 2008, the Courts Law of 1984 was amended, enabling the Minister ofJustice to issue
a decree announcing types of decisions for which interlocutory appeals would not be allowed. In 2009, the Minister issued such a decree thereby limiting the scope of interlocutory appeals. See sources cited supra note 45.
76
Parties occasionally attempt to bypass this prohibition by filing petitions to the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. See, e.g., HCJ 11339/05 The State of
Israel v. The District Court of Beer Sheba (July 11, 2006) (unpublished decision) (petitioning to the High Court of Justice against the district court, to circumvent the lack of interlocutory appeals in criminal trials). However, these cases are both negligible in volume
and external to the criminal appellate system.
77
The website does not include cases decided in camera, but since those cases are but
a fraction of the cases decided by the Court, the omission does not materially affect the
analysis here. See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, § 70(a)
(1983-1984).
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We thus examine only one slice, albeit the most important slice doctrinally, of a broader universe of ISC activity.
Another potential limitation of our study stems from selection effects. Most cases are not appealed. Settlements and other case-clearing activity persist at all levels of litigation. Nevertheless, at the
appellate level, studies that begin with the mass of trial court outcomes and that do account for the decision to appeal suggest that
more complete accounting does not alter the core results limited to
the subset of appealed cases.7 8
The cases identified by the methods described above were coded
by student research assistants. Prior to the student coding, the authors designed a data form to structure the coding. After review of
the performance of the form and the students in an initial set of cases,
the form was revised and a final form constructed. The students used
that revised form to code the cases, under the supervision of the
authors.
E.

Coding Case Outcomes

In coding the cases, the variable affirmed is coded as "1"for cases
in which the ISC affirmed the lower-court ruling. This includes only
cases in which the ISC unambiguously affirmed the ruling below. The
variable affirmed treats cases recorded as having results consisting of
"reversed," "reversed and vacated," and "vacated" and other ambiguous outcomes (see Table 2 below) as not being affirmed. In such
cases, affirmed is coded as "0." Of course, dichotomous coding of appellate outcomes can be an oversimplification. This effect is cushioned in part by affirmed excluding, and treating as missing (for
purposes of computing affirmance and reversal rates), cases recorded
as having ambiguous results consisting of vacated or any "in part"
combination of affirmed, reversed, and vacated (e.g., affirmed in part,
reversed in part). It also treats as missing the following classes of
cases: cases recorded as compromise verdicts, cases in which the appellate disposition was by consent, cases in which the parties reached a
private compromise and the appeal was therefore not resolved on the
merits, cases in which the appeal was withdrawn before ISC adjudication, and cases returned to the lower court for nonmerits reasons
(coded as "Return to Court") and then recoded as part of the outcome category labeled "Other." The variable reversed is the opposite of
affirmed, and is coded "1" when affirmed is "0" and "0" when affirmed is
"1."7 The other outcome studied is whether, in discretionary-jurisdic78

Plaintiphobia,supra note 4, at 948-49; see also Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 4, at

121.
79 A total affirmanceis more restrictive than an affirmance. It treats as nonaffirmances,
and hence as reversals, some results treated as missing in defining affirmed. These results
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tion cases, the ISC granted review. We use the variable review granted
to code the decision whether to grant discretionary review. The variable has the value of "1"when the ISC granted review and "0" when it
declined review. The variable review denied is the opposite of review
granted, and is coded "1"when review granted is "0" and "0" when review
granted is "1."

IV
RESULTS

We first report frequencies of the kinds of cases and the status of
the parties. We then compare outcomes by jurisdictional source and
explore the associations between outcomes and (1) plaintiff-defendant status (government-defendant status in criminal cases)
and (2) party status as individual, corporation, or government.
A.

Types of Cases and Party Status

Table 1 reports descriptive statistics about the characteristics of
cases in the sample. Panel A shows the number of cases involving
each case type, subdivided by whether the cases were civil or criminal
and whether jurisdiction was mandatory or discretionary. Panel B
provides a similar breakdown by legal status of appellant and appellee.
In assigning cases to specific types, we used the first case type coded.
The coding form allowed for multiple case types and other reasonable
groupings accounting for multiple types within a case are possible.
The single-type reporting convention used in the table achieves clarity
at the cost of completeness.
Panel A shows that the three most frequent classes of mandatoryjurisdiction civil cases were property, contract, and tort, which together accounted for 301 of 571 (52.7%) of the mandatoryjurisdiction docket. The discretionary civil docket consisted more of cases
raising issues of civil procedure, which comprised 136 of 598 (22.7%)
of cases compared to 8.8% of the mandatory docket.
In both mandatory and discretionary criminal cases, appeals relating to sentence dominate the docket. Although our single-case type
reporting in the table oversimplifies, it is not the source of the dominance of sentencing issues. Even if one focuses on cases in which sentencing was the only issue of a criminal appeal, sentencing dominates
the ISC's criminal docket. In 413 of 931 (44.4%) discretionary criminal appeals, sentencing was the only basis for appeal and in 951 of
1,403 (67.8%) mandatory criminal appeals, sentencing was the only
basis for appeal.
are "affirmed and reversed," "affirmed, reversed, and vacated," and "affirmed and vacated."
Using total affirmance rather than affirmance does not materially change our results.
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1.

FREQUENCY OF CASE TYPES AND LITIGANr STATUS
IN ISRAELI SUPREME COURT
Civil Cases

A. Case type
Case type
Administrative law
Associations
Civil procedure
Contract
Debt

Insurance
Miscellaneous
Property
Tax
Tort
Total

Criminal Cases

Discretionary Mandatory Case type
17
27
136
55

39
43
50
102

64

45

20
51
108
11
109
598

38
19
100
36
99
571

Evidence
Procedure
Sentence
Substantive law

144
121
65
54
14
11
120
25
55
609

155
128
69
75
21
13
68
38
30
597

Discretionary Mandatory
89
111
501
92

Verdict

138

Total

931

B. Appellant v. Appellee characteristics
Discretionary Mandatory Litigant pairs
Litigant pairs
Ind. v. ind.
Ind. v. corp.
Corp. v. ind.
Corp. v. corp.
Gov't. v. ind.
Gov't. v. corp.
Ind. v. gov't.
Corp. v. gov't.
Other
Total

[Vol. 96:693

Ind. v. ind.
Ind. v. corp.
Corp. v. ind.
Corp. v. corp.
Gov't. v. ind.
Gov't. v. corp.
Ind. v. gov't.
Corp. v. gov't.
Other
Total

4
16
1036
9
338
1403

Discretionary Mandatory
4
0
0
0
12
0
904
23

3
946

9
0
0
1
191
2
1198
5
4
1410

Note. Panel A excludes cases 59 cases in which a case type was not clearly ascertainable. Source.
Substantive opinions available from the IJA website for the periods of 2006 and 2007 stated in
text.

Panel B of Table 1 shows the litigant pairs, with the appellant
listed first in the table's first column. For obvious reasons, governments and individuals are the dominant litigant pairs in criminal
cases. In civil cases, in the interest of simplifying the presentation, we
again limit the groupings to one litigant pair per case. Individual appellants dominate in both mandatory and discretionary cases, comprising more than one-half of appellants in both categories.
Corporations and government entities are also frequent parties, with
the government appearing predominantly as an appellee.
Table 2 reports the outcomes of ISC cases. It is surprisingly difficult to construct a simple coding scheme for the outcome of cases.8 0
Table 2 suggests this is true even on appeal. We address some of this
complexity as discussed in Part III.E above to arrive at clear cases of
affirmance or reversal. In discretionary cases, the dominant outcome
is to either deny review or to deny review and indicate that, even if the
s0 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and
Why Should We Care?,6J. EMpucA. LEGAL STUD. 111, 128 tbl.2 (2009) (showing twenty-nine
different codes for outcomes of U.S. federal district court cases).
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case had been reviewed on the merits, it would have been affirmed.
In both civil and criminal mandatoryjurisdiction cases, affirmance is
the dominant dispositive outcome on the merits. In mandatory civil
cases, however, substantial activity occurs that likely indicates a settlement. Indeed, compromise or withdrawal occurred almost as often as
simple reversal. This is consistent with U.S. findings of substantial
numbers of appeals not reaching conclusion in the appellate court.8 1
TABLE

2.

ISRAEL SUPREME COURT OUTCOMES
Criminal
discretionary

Civil
discretionary

Deny review

175

202

-

-

Deny review, would have affirmed

675

278

-

-

Grant review

16

9

-

-

Grant review, affirm
Grant review, reverse

26
21

29
63

-

-

Affirm
Reverse
Affirm or reverse in part

-

-

Compromise verdict

-

Compromise or withdrawal
Reverse, affirm, or vacate with consent

-

-

-

-

-

101
13

Vacate

-

-

-

53

Outcome

Other
Total

33
946

Criminal
mandatory

1023
325
31

-

-

8

20
609

14

17
1410

Civil
mandatory

230
113
35

39

13
597

Source. Substantive opinions available from the JA website for the periods of 2006 and 2007
stated in text.

B.

Appellate Outcomes by Jurisdictional Source

Table 3 reports, by jurisdictional source, separately for criminal
and civil cases, the reversal rate for cases with a clear reversal or affirmance. Panel A summarizes discretionary-jurisdiction cases and includes the number of cases for which review was denied. Panel B
summarizes mandatory-jurisdiction cases. For cases in which review
was granted, two rows report data for each combination ofjurisdiction
and civil or criminal cases. The first row is the number of cases fitting
the row and column description. The second is the percentage of
cases reversed or affirmed given that review was granted. For discretionary cases, as indicated by the "Review denied" column, the most
common outcome by far was denial of review.
Panel A shows that, conditional on review being granted in discretionary cases, 44.7% of criminal cases and 68.5% of civil cases were
reversed. As expected in light of the discussion in Part III, these reversal rates noticeably exceed those in mandatory-jurisdiction cases.
Panel B shows that, in mandatory criminal cases, the reversal rate was
81 See, e.g., Eisenberg & Heise, supra note 4, at 123 (noting that just over one-half of
appeals from trials culminated in a final appellate court decision).
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24.1% compared to 32.9% in mandatory civil cases. Both of the discretionary/mandatory reversal-rate differences are highly statistically
significant (p < 0.005). These results are consistent with the ISC granting review of discretionary cases (1) that are difficult and more prone
to reversal and (2) in which the ISC justices disagree with the outcome below.
TABLE

3.

Type of case

ISRAEL SUPREME COURT CASE OUTCOMES

Review denied

Total

850

29
31.5%

850
47
100%
480
92
100%

325
24.1%
113
32.9%

1023
75.9%
230
67.1%

1348
100%
343
100%

522
28.5%

1308
71.5%

Reverse

Affirm

21
44.7%

26
55.3%

63
68.5%

A. Discretionary cases
Criminal discretionary

Civil discretionary

B. Mandatory cases
Criminal mandatory
Civil mandatory

Total

480

1330

3160
100%

Note. The 850 "review denied" criminal cases include 675 cases in which review was denied
but the Court stated that full review would have resulted in affirmance. The 480 "review
denied" civil cases include 278 cases in which review was denied but the Court stated that
full review would have resulted in affirmance. Source: Substantive opinions available from
the IJA website for the periods of 2006 and 2007 stated in text.

From a practical perspective, the high reversal rates in discretionaryjurisdiction cases are perhaps less important than the low rate at
which parties succeed in obtaining ISC review. Table 3 shows that, in
discretionary-jurisdiction criminal cases, review was denied in 850 of
897 cases in which review was sought. If one adds to these 850 cases
the 26 affirmances when the ISC granted review, criminal defendants
obtained relief from the ISC in 21 of 897 cases, or 2.3% of filings with
the requisite information. The story in civil discretionary cases is similar. The ISC denied review in 480 out of 572 cases. The 29 affirmances in cases granted review mean that the result below was clearly
reversed in 63 of 572 cases, or only 11.0% of appellate filings.
C.

Mandatory-Jurisdiction Cases and Litigant Status

Table 4 reports reversal rates for mandatory civil cases, subdivided by the status of the parties, separately reported in the rows, and
the party appealing, separately reported in the columns. The rows
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include both a frequency count and percentages. The table does not
show dramatically different rates of affirmance depending on whether
the defendant or the plaintiff appealed, or for individuals and corporations. The largest defendant-plaintiff difference between affirmance rates (other than for the litigant pair "Other") is between
plaintiffs and defendants in cases involving corporate appellants and
individual appellees. Corporate appellant-plaintiffs litigating against
individual defendants find their appeals usually failing, with an affirmance rate of 88.9%. Corporate appellant-defendants encounter affirmance rates of only 52.2%, a difference that is not statistically
significant (p = 0.103).
TABLE

4.

AFFIRMANCE RATE BY LITIGANT PAIRS AND APPELLANT
STATUS, MANDATORY CIVIL CASES
Party appealing

Defendant
81.8%
22
45.5%
11
52.2%
23

Plaintiff
66.7%
42
73.3%
30
88.9%
9

72.7%

76.2%

Gov't. v. corp.

11
16.7%
12
42.9%

21
0.0%
1
-

7

0

Ind. v. gov't.

75.0%

87.5%

4

32

Corp. v. gov't.

100%
2

81.0%
21

Other

57.1%
7

93.3%
15

Total

57.6%
99

77.8%
171

Appellant/Appellee
Ind. v. ind.
Ind. v. corp.
Corp. v. ind.
Corp. v. corp.

Gov't. v. ind.

Note. Table is limited to cases with a clear affirmance or reversal. Source: Substantive
opinions available from the IJA website for all cases decided in 2007 and all cases decided
in the months of August through December 2006.

In his famous article Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead, Marc Galanter argued that repeat players, namely litigants involved in similar
litigation over time, fare better in litigation.8 2 According to Galanter,
many private entities, including financial institutions, insurance com82

Galanter, supra note 5, at 125.

716

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:693

panies, and large corporations, enjoy the advantages of repeat play
and thus can operate in the courtroom in much the same way as the
government. Subsequent empirical studies of trial and appellate
courts have confirmed Galanter's basic findings.8 3
Our findings do not support a similar consistent procorporate effect in the ISC in its function as a court of appeal. Table 4 shows that
when corporate plaintiffs appealed lower-court defeats against individual defendants, they rarely succeeded. The affirmance rate was almost
90%, though this rate is based on relatively few cases. Corporate defendants who appealed lower courts losses to individual plaintiffs did
succeed in obtaining reversals in about 50% of appeals. The absence
of a consistent procorporate effect in the ISC aligns with previous
83
For studies conducted in the United States see, for example, Donald R. Songer &
Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 235, 241 (1992) (analyzing both the published and unpublished decisions of the U.S. courts of appeals and finding that the overall success rate of the
government was roughly four times higher than the success rate of individuals and two
one-half times the success rate of businesses). A study of federal civil cases between the
years 1971 and 1991 revealed that big businesses (Fortune 2000 companies) had a success
rate of 71% as plaintiffs and 61% as defendants when facing all types of litigants in court,
whereas nonbusiness litigants won only 64% of the time as plaintiff and a mere 28% of the
time as defendant. See Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporationsin Court: Big Business
Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 497, 558 (1996). Similarly, a study of diversity cases in federal courts found that in instances where litigants are
of the same type (individual versus individual or corporate versus corporate), the plaintiff
prevails 72% and 75% of the time, respectively; however, when corporate plaintiffs sue
individuals, they win 91% of the time, but when individuals sue corporate plaintiffs, they
win only 50% of the time. See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The LitigiousPlaintiff
Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S92, S103 tbl.3
(1997). More recent empirical work assessing Galanter's theory has focused on appellate
courts at the state and federal levels. See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, "Haves" Versus
"HaveNots" in State Supreme Courts: Allocating Docket Space and Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases,
35 LAw & Soc'v REv. 393 (2001); Plaintiphobia,supra note 4; Donald R. Songer, Reginald S.
Sheehan & Susan Brodie Haire, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead over Time?: Applying Galanter's Framework to Decisions of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1925-1988, in IN LITIGATION: Do
THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 85, 93 tbl.3.2 (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey
eds., 2003) (describing a study of decisions from all circuits in the U.S. courts of appeals
for a sixty-four-year period between 1925 and 1988 and finding that the federal government had a net advantage of 25.6%, state and local governments had a net advantage of
15.6%, businesses had a net advantage of negative 2.8%, and, at the bottom, individuals,
with a net advantage of negative 12.6%); see also Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 681 ("The
'haves' may come out ahead on appeal but their greater success rate may be completely
attributable to their having come out ahead below."). Several studies applying Galanter's
theory to court decisions in other common law countries have generated similar findings.
See, e.g., Burton M. Atkins, Party Capability Theory as an Explanationfor Intervention Behavior in
the English Court of Appea4 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 881, 894-95 (1991) (surveying the English
Court of Appeal and finding that the government enjoyed a 25% advantage over corporate
litigants and corporations enjoyed a 14% advantage over individuals); Peter McCormick,
Party Capability Theory and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1992, 26
CAN. J. POL. Sci. 523, 532 (1993) (describing a study of the Canadian Supreme Court revealing that the government's net advantage was approximately 5% higher than that enjoyed by big business, 26% higher than the net advant age found for other businesses, and
30% higher than the success rate for individuals).
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findings relating to the ISC's function as High Court of Justice. In
Dotan's 1999 article, he found that in litigation before the Israeli
High Court ofJustice, the "haves" do not come out ahead.8 4 Corporations enjoyed only a limited advantage in litigation outcomes over
"have nots" (the group of "have nots" in the Dotan study was comprised of welfare service customers, immigrants, disabled individuals,
and petitioners exempt from the duty to pay court fees) .85 Moreover,
the study also found that when "have nots" were represented by legal
counsel, the corporations did not enjoy any advantage whatsoever.8 6
The most extreme result in Table 4 is how well the government
fares on appeal compared to other litigants. The two litigant pairs
involving the government as a losing defendant that appeals are the
least consistent with the expected "affirmed effect" on appeal.87 That
is, in most classes of mandatory-jurisdiction cases, the ISC tends to
affirm the lower-court rulings whenever its holding represents a clear
affirmance or reversal. However, when the government lost in the
lower court and appealed as defendant, the affirmance rates are low.
In cases in which the government-as-defendant appealed a lower-court
loss to an individual plaintiff, only two cases in twelve were affirmed.
In cases in which the government-as-defendant appealed a lower-court
loss to corporate plaintiffs, three cases in seven were affirmed. The
difference between affirmance rates in government-as-defendant-appellant cases and other defendant appeals is highly statistically significant (p = 0.004). This result persists as statistically significant in
logistic regression models, with affirmance as the dependent variable
and explanatory variables, litigant pairs, and case categories as dummy
variables. Note also that when the government won in the lower court
and the nongovernment party appealed to the ISC, the expected affirmed effect holds.
Mandatory-jurisdiction criminal cases followed a similar pattern.
The government in such cases always serves as the prosecutor, analogous to the civil plaintiff who initiates a lawsuit. So, there is no opportunity to study the government as a defendant in criminal cases. But
Israeli law does allow the government to appeal lower-court rulings in
criminal cases.8 8 We can therefore study the government as appellant
84
See Dotan, supra note 6, at 1059 ("[I]n litigation before the Israeli High Court of
Justice, the 'haves' enjoyed only a limited advantage over 'have nots' in litigation
outcomes.").
85
See id. at 1069-71.
86
Dotan, supra note 6, at 1071-72, 1077.
87 These findings support the claim that the state is a unique type of litigant, qualitatively different from all nonstate litigants, including other repeat players. See, e.g., Herbert
M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come Out Ahead in Appellate Courts?,
in IN LITIGATION: DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD?, supra note 83, at 343.
88
See supra note 52.
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and compare it to the criminal defendant as appellant. Table 5 reports the results.
TABLE

5.

AFFIRMANCE RATE BY GOVERNMENT STATUS,
MANDATORY CRIMINAL CASES

Party appealing
Government
Defendant

Total

Reversed

Affirmed

Total

146
81.1%
173
15.1%

34
18.9%
975
84.9%

180
100%
1148
100%

319
24.0%

1009
76.0%

1328
100%

Note. Table is limited to cases with a clear affirmance or reversal. Source. Substantive
opinions available from the IJA website for all cases decided in 2006 and 2007.

The table shows that the government secured reversal in 81.1% of
the 146 cases it appealed. Criminal defendants, in contrast, secured
reversal in only 15.1% of the 975 cases they appealed. This result
likely is a combination of two forces. First, the government is more
selective than defendants in deciding which cases to appeal. Given
the high personal stakes for defendants as well as the availability of
public defense-for which funding is borne by the taxpayers-the
tendency to appeal is strong and can dominate even in cases with
weak chances of appellate success. But, even accounting for such selection, the ISC reversal rate for government appeals is high.
Through either the government's careful selection of cases to appeal
or the ISC's strong tendency to favor the government compared to
lower courts-or both-the result is a reversal rate that is similar to
the affirmance rate in cases appealed by criminal defendants.
D.

Obtaining Discretionary Review and Party Status

A further question is whether the government succeeds more
often than other litigants not only in obtaining reversals but also in
securing ISC review of lower-court decisions in discretionary-jurisdiction cases. Table 6 shows the rate at which review was granted for
cases with a clearly defined appellant in discretionary-jurisdiction
cases.
Although the government sought ISC discretionary review in few
cases, it proved substantially more successful than other parties in oltaining review when it sought it. Panel A shows that, in criminal cases,
the government obtained review in 71.4% of the cases sought compared to a 5.6% review rate for defendants. Panel B shows that, in
civil cases, the government obtained review in 47.4% of the cases
sought compared to a 14.2% review rate for other parties. Both differ-
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ences are highly statistically significant (p = 0.001). In cases not involving the government, the highest rate of review by a litigant pair in
pairs with more than ten cases was 36.4% (8 of 22), representing cases
involving corporate defendants that appealed lower-court losses to individual plaintiffs.
TABLE

6.

DISCRETIONARY JURISDICTION GRANTS OF REVIEW

Party appealing
A. Criminal cases
Government
Defendant

Total

B. Civil cases
Government
Non-government party

Total

Review denied

Review granted

Total

2
28.6%
806
94.4%

5
71.4%
48
5.6%

7
100%
854
100%

808
93.8%

53
6.2%

861
100%

10
52.6%
461
85.9%

9
47.4%
76
14.2%

19
100%
537
100% (rounded)

471
84.7%

85
15.3%

556
100%

Note. Table is limited to cases with identifiable government vs. nongovernment status and
with a clear outcome of review being granted or denied. Source. Substantive opinions
available from the IJA website for the periods of 2006 and 2007 stated in text.

V
DISCUSSION

The ISC exhibits the expected affirmed effect in mandatoryjurisdiction cases and the expected greater reversal rate in discretionaryjurisdiction cases. In discretionary-jurisdiction cases, the result of
greatest practical importance is the high rate at which discretionary
review is denied, except when the government seeks review. This
quantification of the denial rate may be of practical interest.
Denial-of-review's dominance has significant implications for further study of the ISC. Scholars wishing to test the effect of justices'
policy preferences8 9 or personal characteristics9 0 should account for
the process of selecting cases. Table 2 above shows that the most comJ. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE Arri(2002).
90 For a study of the effect of judges' personal characteristics at the Israeli trial court
level, see Oren Gazal-Ayal & Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Let My People Go: Ethnic In-Group
Bias in judicial Decisions-Evidencefrom a Randomized Natural Experiment, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LE89

See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD

TUDINAL MODEL REVISITED

GAL STUD. 403 (2010).
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mon ISC outcome is denial of review, which accounts for more than
one-third of its dispositions: more dispositions than clear affirmances
and reversals on the merits combined. Without accounting for this
selection process, it is difficult to be certain that study of merits dispositions alone accurately reflects ajustice's body of work. For example,
it is possible to implement policy preferences through voting to review
or deny review of lower-court dispositions. In the extreme, the policy
preferences of a justice who agrees with all lower court rulings and
votes to deny review cannot be detected through observation of dispositions on the merits. The denial-of-review dominance is significant
for yet another reason. Usually, the decision to review discretionary
appeals is made by a single justice,9 ' (informally) appointed to the
task by the Chief Justice; this justice is replaced every few years. The
implications of our findings are that one of the most important justices in the ISC is the one appointed to review discretionary appeals.
The low percentage of cases in which review is granted also indicates partial compliance with the Court's ruling in Chenion Haifa.92
But the exceedingly high reversal rate among the cases in which review is granted indicates deviance from the Chenion Haifa requirement. Unless district courts in important cases tend to systematically
err in a direction with which the ISC disagrees, there is no ex ante
reason to think that important cases will generate reversal rates as
high as the observed rates. One might think that, in important cases,
district courts would be unusually deferential to ISC precedent since
"new law" might be viewed as being more appropriately made by the
ISC rather than district courts.
In addition to our findings' implications for Israeli courts, this
study's data facilitate comparing the ISC with other courts. With due
regard for the limits of intercountry comparisons, it is interesting to
compare the ISC's outcomes with those of analogous U.S. courts. The
32.9% mandatory civil case reversal rate in Table 3 is a bit higher, but
not dramatically so, than the reported reversal rates in the United
States for mandatoryjurisdiction cases.9 3 As noted in Part II, although
the ISC is a court of last resort, in mandatory-jurisdiction cases it does
not review the decisions of an intermediate appellate court.
Mandatory ISC jurisdiction is associated with direct appeals from
Israel's district courts.
The most appropriate comparison we can construct is with
mandatory-jurisdiction cases in U.S. state supreme courts (SSCs) in
91 See Courts Law (Consolidated Version), 5744-1984, 38 LSI 271, § 26(4)
(1983-1984).
92 CA 103/82 Chenion Haifa v. Matzat Or 36(3) PD 123 [1982].
93 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1479-80 tbl.4 (finding an average reversal rate
of 28.1% for mandatory-jurisdiction cases in U.S. state supreme courts).
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states that do not have intermediate appellate courts. To facilitate
that comparison, we alternatively code ISC outcomes using an additional case outcome variable that may more closely match the outcome coding in a study of SSCs in the United States. That coding
treated vacated decisions as reversals. For purposes of this comparative analysis, we alternatively recode the mandatory civil case "vacated"
outcomes (53 in Table 2) as reversals.
After reporting the alternative measures of the ISC results in the
first two rows, Table 7 reports the reversal rates for mandatory-jurisdiction civil cases in U.S. SSCs in eleven states that lack intermediate appellate courts. The U.S. SSC data are from a study of every available
SSC opinion in 2003 that used a similar methodology to code reversals
and affirmances.9 4
TABLE

7.

MANDATORY CIVIL CASE OUTCOMES IN THE ISRAEL SUPREME

COURT AND IN

U.S.

STATE SUPREME COURTS WITHOUT

INTERMEDIATE COURTS
Number
of cases

Reversal
rate (%)

Lower
95% CI

Upper
95% CI

Israel Supreme Court
Original outcome coding
Vacated cases coded as reversals

343
396

32.9
41.9

27.9
37.0

37.9
46.8

U.S. state courts
Delaware
Maine
Montana
North Dakota
Nevada
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Wyoming

29
92
195
106
32
98
98
75
94

58.6
32.6
22.1
28.3
40.6
20.4
35.7
33.3
28.7

38.9
23.1
16.4
20.0
23.7
12.9
26.3
22.9
19.9

76.5
43.2
28.5
37.9
59.4
29.7
46.0
45.2
39.0

Total, U.S state courts

819

29.3

26.2

32.6

Sources: Substantive opinions available from the IJA website for all cases decided in 2007 and all
cases decided in the months of August through December 2006; data gathered for Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 2.

The ISC reversal rate varies significantly depending on the coding convention adopted for vacated cases. With our original codingshown in the table's first ISC row-the reversal rate was 32.9%. With
the alternative coding, the reversal rate increased to 41.9%. The 95%
confidence intervals for the two ISC reversal rates, shown in the table's last two columns, overlap only slightly. So, the reversal rate depends substantially on the coding convention used for ISC
dispositions recorded as "vacated."
94

See id.
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Similarly, the comparison with SSCs depends on which coding
convention is adopted. Under the alternative coding, the ISC reversal
rate exceeds the rate of every SSC except Delaware, which only had
twenty-nine mandatory civil opinions in 2003. The rate for the state
SSCs combined is shown in Table Ts last row, which shows an aggregate reversal rate of 29.3% and a 95% confidence interval of 26.2% to
32.6%. The 95% confidence interval for the ISC, alternatively coded,
is substantially and statistically significantly higher than that for the
state SSCs combined. If the ISC "vacated" outcomes are excluded,
then ISC reversal rates are similar to those of SSCs as a whole. Note
also that variation in reversal rates exists across the eleven SSCs, with
Delaware having the highest reversal rate by a significant margin.
In comparing mandatory criminal case outcomes, the "vacated"
outcome issue does not arise because we did not record a "vacated"
outcome for this class of cases. This makes the cross-country comparison simpler. Table 8 shows the ISC reversal rate of 24.1% compared
to the aggregate state SSC rate of 20.8%.95 The ISC 95% confidence
interval overlaps with the aggregate SSC confidence interval and with
each state court confidence interval except that of Rhode Island,
which has a noticeably low reversal rate.
TABLE

8.

MANDATORY CRIMINAL CASE OUTCOMES IN THE ISRAEL

SUPREME COURT AND IN

U.S.

STATE SUPREME COURTS

WITHOUT INTERMEDIATE COURTS
Number of cases

Reversal rate

Lower 95% CI

Upper 95% CI

Israel Supreme Court

1348

24.1

21.8

26.4

U.S. state courts
Delaware
Maine
Montana
North Dakota
Nevada
Rhode Island
South Dakota
Vermont
Wyoming
Total, U.S state courts

38
33
109
44
18
47
28
20
63
400

23.7
30.3
17.4
11.4
44.4
8.5
10.7
30.0
30.2
20.8

11.4
15.6
10.8
3.8
21.5
2.4
2.3
11.9
19.2
16.9

40.2
48.7
25.9
24.6
69.2
20.4
28.2
54.3
43.0
25.1

Sources: Substantive opinions available from the IJA website for all cases decided in 2006 and
2007; data gathered for Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2.

In comparing discretionary cases, the absence of "vacated" outcomes in the ISC again promotes more direct comparison of the ISC
with SSCs. Table 9 compares ISC reversal rates with reversal rates in
discretionary-jurisdiction cases in those states that have intermediate
95 The reversal rate for the SSCs excluding capital punishment cases was 21.0%, with
a 95% confidence interval of 17.0% to 25.3%.
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appellate courts. To conserve space, we report only the aggregate
rates for the forty-one state courts (Oklahoma and Texas have separate appellate courts for civil and criminal cases) included in the
summary.
TABLE

9.

DIsCRETIONARY CRIMINAL AND. CIVIL CASE OUTCOMES IN THE

ISRAEL SUPREME COURT AND IN

U.S.

STATE SUPREME COURTS

WITH INTERMEDIATE COURTS
Number
of cases

Reversal
rate

Lower
95% CI

Upper
95% CI

A. Discretionary civil cases
Israel Supreme Court
U.S. state courts

92
1527

68.5%
53.6%

58.8%
51.0%

78.2%
56.1%

B. Discretionary criminal cases
Israel Supreme Court
U.S. state courts

47
889

44.7%
49.9%

29.9%
46.6%

59.4%
53.3%

Sources: Substantive opinions available from the IJA website for the periods of 2006 and 2007
stated in text; data gathered for Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2.

Panel A shows a 68.5% reversal rate in ISC discretionary civil
cases compared to a 53.6% aggregate reversal rate in SSCs. The 95%
confidence intervals do not overlap; the difference is statistically significant. Panel B shows a 44.7% reversal rate in discretionary criminal
cases compared to a 49.9% aggregate rate in SSCs. The 95% confidence intervals substantially overlap, and these rates are clearly not
statistically significantly different.
So both mandatory and discretionary civil case reversal rates differ noticeably between the ISC and state SSCs, but neither mandatory
nor discretionary criminal case reversal rates differ. For mandatory
civil cases, we cannot exclude the possibility that the difference is
small, depending on whether ISC vacated outcomes are in fact analogous to reversals. For discretionary civil cases, the high ISC reversal
rate suggests that the ISC basically grants review to reverse cases with
which its justices disagree.
One possible explanation is that the ISC appears to operate
under a substantially greater burden of criminal cases than SSCs.
Criminal cases comprise about 37% of mandatory SSC opinions.9 6 In
Israel, for the seventeen months for which we have data for both civil
and criminal mandatory cases, criminal cases never comprised less
than 49% of the mandatory docket and were, on average, about 64%
of that docket. The ISC may lack adequate time to address discretionary civil cases other than those rulings the justices feel they cannot let
stand. This would lead to low rates of granting discretionary review, as
96 Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 2, at 1492 tbl.7 (including capital punishment
cases).
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observed in Table 6, and little room to choose cases that justices agree
with because of the cases' interest or importance.
The mandatory criminal docket might be expected to generate
similar reversal-oriented pressure on the discretionary criminal
docket. Yet that docket's reversal rate is substantially and significantly
lower than the ISC discretionary civil reversal rate. Perhaps the ISC
feels a greater need to review criminal than civil cases based on the
importance of the issues. This would lead to the selection of a smaller
proportion of cases based on the felt need to reverse the ruling below.
Other forces may be at work, such as greater differences in preferences between ISC justices and district courtjudges in civil as opposed
to criminal cases. But the pressure of the criminal docket surely influences the resources justices can devote to discretionary cases.
CONCLUSION

This study of ISC cases documents several important patterns.
The ISC overwhelmingly tends to deny review when it has discretion
to do so. Litigants might be advised that the chance of obtaining ISC
review is, in general, quite small. This observed behavior complies
with the requirements of Chenion Haifa. But the ISC's high rate of
finding error in cases it reviews on a discretionary basis may indicate
that the ISC is not adhering to its own criteria for selecting cases for
review.
Our other major findings are: (1) in mandatoryjurisdiction cases,
the ISC affirmed lower court rulings in a substantial majority of cases;
(2) in discretionary cases in which the ISC granted review, it reversed
at a much higher rate than in mandatory-jurisdiction cases; (3) sentencing issues dominated the criminal docket and criminal cases
predominate over civil cases; and (4) the government was significantly
more successful than other litigants in obtaining reversals of lowercourt rulings and in securing review of those rulings.
This last finding can be explained in numerous ways: one is that
the ISC is biased in favor of the State, either believing the State to be
more diligent or due to proprosecutorial tendencies of the justices.
Another possibility is the State's rigorous screening process (both as
appellant and appellee), which leads to its cases being more meritorious than those of both individual litigants and corporations. A third
option is that the district court exhibits an anti-State bias, which is
then corrected by the ISC. Our study cannot support or discard any
of the abovementioned hypotheses. This entails additional empirical
research that we hope will be conducted in the future.
In comparing the ISC's behavior with that of other courts, reversal rates were similar to rates in cases with analogous jurisdiction in
U.S. states' highest courts, except in discretionaryjurisdiction civil
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cases. The ISC tended to reverse such cases at a higher rate than U.S.
courts. In mandatory-jurisdiction cases, the ISC did not exhibit a consistent prodefendant pattern of reversal similar to that found in U.S.
appellate courts with mandatory jurisdiction. 9 7 This suggests that the
U.S. result is not an inherent characteristic of appellate processes. If a
prodefendant pattern were an inherent characteristic, it should have
been detected in Israel as well.

97

See sources cited supra note 4; see also supra Table 4.
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